Anger, Irony, and the Formal Rationality of Professionalism by Mehrotra, Ajay K.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2010
Anger, Irony, and the Formal Rationality of
Professionalism
Ajay K. Mehrotra
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, amehrotr@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Political Economy
Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mehrotra, Ajay K., "Anger, Irony, and the Formal Rationality of Professionalism" (2010). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 31.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/31
FORUM: RESPONSE
Anger, Irony, and the Formal Rationality
of Professionalism
AJAY K. MEHROTRA
One of the challenges in writing about the history of American law and
political economy is determining the proper amount of historical context
necessary to make sense of past institutional and organizational change.
Where to begin and end a historical narrative and how much to include
about the broader social, cultural, political, and economic conditions of a par-
ticular place and time are, of course, questions that accompany any attempt to
reconstruct the past. How one addresses these issues invariably shapes the
motives and intentions that can be ascribed to historical figures. In their elo-
quent and thoughtful comments, Christopher Capozzola and Michael
Bernstein have urged me to think more carefully about these issues, about
where my story begins and ends, about the broader social, political, and
material circumstances that animated World War I state-building, and
about the seemingly apolitical ideas and actions of the Treasury lawyers
who are the center of "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys."
Both commentators seem to agree with my primary thesis that a group of
elite Treasury lawyers played a pivotal role in building the administrative
capacity of a new fiscal polity that simultaneously advanced the positive
rights of American new liberalism and circumscribed the possibility of rad-
ical changes to the structure of postwar U.S. political economy. Yet each
commentator questions whether I have overlooked larger historical circum-
stances and processes, and whether this omission has led me to overstate
the contributions and achievements of these bureaucratic legal pro-
fessionals. Capozzola vividly recounts the sweeping anger and discon-
tent-what he aptly refers to as the "hell-raising"-that existed at the
turn of the century, and especially during the wartime calls for self-sacrifice
and civic obligation. In doing so, Capozzola questions the pervasiveness
and durability of the public trust created by the wartime Treasury lawyers.'
1. Christopher Capozzola, "Raising Revenue and Raising Hell," (in this volume).
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Similarly, Bernstein draws attention to the potential "ironies" that he sees
shrouded in my account of lawyers as moderating influences. He highlights
"the machinations of power, self-aggrandizement, or political manipu-
lation" that he contends are embedded in "the formal rationality of
professionalism." 2
I am extremely grateful for these trenchant comments. These critiques
identify areas in need of clarification, but I do not believe they undermine
my main argument about how a representative group of elite legal pro-
fessionals helped create a distinctively juridical fiscal state during the First
World War. I offer this brief response not only to thank the commentators
for their careful reading of my work but also to elaborate on my research
findings and continue the scholarly discussion about the historical relation-
ship between taxation, professionalism, and American state-formation.
Hell-Raising Anger and Fiscal State-Building
The turn of the century was, as Capozzola colorfully describes it, a unique
moment of social and political turmoil-a moment when "hell-raising
pushed an income tax through Congress," not once but twice. The
World War I Treasury Department harnessed this hell-raising anger, par-
ticularly the rage aimed at war profiteering, to raise a tremendous amount
of revenue and build a nascent fiscal state. In the process, federal officials
also helped reconfigure the relationship between citizens and their state.
Although Capozzola concurs with much of my narrative, he implicitly
asks several important questions about the wider social context in which
the Treasury lawyers operated. In a subtle and insightful criticism, he
notes that fiscal citizenship during the war entailed "not only citizens'
duty to pay taxes, but also the authority to help collect them." Focusing
on war bonds, and drawing from his excellent book on World War I,
Capozzola chronicles the many ways in which ordinary Americans tapped
a prewar political culture of civic voluntarism to coerce and intimidate
fellow citizens into purchasing war bonds. This form of "popular revenue
collection," Capozzola writes, "was one of the modes of governance that
the administrative state sought to displace."'3
If "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" neglects the salience of civic
voluntarism to the collection of wartime tax revenues, it is mainly because
2. Michael Bernstein, "Tocqueville v. Weber" (in this volume, 237, 240).
3. Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the
Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Capozzola,
"Raising Revenue," 227, 230, 231.
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taxes entailed a different kind of political obligation and legal duty. Unlike
bonds, taxes relied on a unique type of "quasi-voluntary compliance" that
went beyond the consumer choices of individuals and had the express
backing of the state's monopoly of physical force. 4 Still, Treasury lawyers
did not hesitate in trying to mobilize private citizens in their efforts to
inculcate a taxpaying culture. Daniel C. Roper elicited the assistance of
the American clergy and the fledgling advertising industry in highlighting
"The Glory of Paying the Income Tax." He also informed journalists that
they had a professional obligation to remind the public that "the man who
pays his Liberty tax in full, without question or murmur, is no less a patriot
than the man who invests in the Liberty bond or volunteers his services for
military duty."
'5
Capozzola is certainly correct that the administrative state sought to
supplant this type of civic voluntarism with a more rational and routinized
mode of governance. That was clear when District Court Judge Louis
FitzHenry overturned Pape's conviction under the Espionage Act for not
purchasing a Liberty bond, as Capozzola points out. It was even more
evident when Daniel Roper reprimanded private citizens who sought to
benefit from turning in potential tax evaders. It was perhaps most obvious
when Congress enacted, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue enforced,
harsh legal penalties and fines that accompanied the delinquent or nonpay-
ment of wartime taxes.
6
Although Capozzola and I agree on the seismic shift in statecraft that
occurred during the Great War, I suppose we hold different interpretations
of the postwar fiscal and administrative polity envisioned by Treasury
lawyers. Woodrow Wilson may have believed that effective democratic
governments could "operate without the exercise of force," and that such
4. Scholars have generally referred to the quasi-voluntary compliance of tax payments mainly
because of the coercive power of the state to enforce the collection of tax payments (Margaret
Levi, Of Rule and Revenue [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989]).
5. "An Urgent Duty And A Glorious Privilege," The Literary Digest, January 12, 1918,
32; Daniel C. Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1941), 180; Daniel Roper, "The War Revenue Act and the Taxpayer," Dec. 13, 1917, 5,
Box 27: "Addresses" in Daniel C. Roper Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript & Special
Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. As part of its "Campaign for
Education," the Bureau of Internal Revenue mobilized a variety of private industries and
voluntary associations including "speakers of the Four Minute Men organization," who
addressed "chambers of commerce, theaters, moving-picture houses," and other public
places (U.S. Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the
State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year 1918 [1919], 963-65).
6. Roper, Fifty Years, 176; U.S. Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year 1918 (1919), 944-45.
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force "is latent because it is understood to be omnipotent."'7 I do not think
that the legal bureaucrats in the Treasury Department imagined a postwar
revenue system "that was substantially insulated from public scrutiny and
the raising of hell," as Capozzola suggests. Russell C. Leffingwell certainly
did not. In his rebuke of Roper's suggestion to return to more "convenient"
sources of revenue after the war, Leffingwell emphasized how "good
democratic doctrine" required "that a direct tax, such as the income tax,
which inevitably involves a certain amount of inconvenience to the tax-
payer, is to be preferred to the indirect tax which involves none at all."
'8
Although Michael Bernstein would rightly have us question the political
and ideological motives behind Leffingwell's support for direct taxes,
the sentiment of Leffingwell's remarks suggests that he favored raising
(some) hell while raising revenue.
Capozzola also raises significant and perceptive questions about period-
ization and the ultimate achievements of the wartime fiscal state. More
specifically, he believes I go too far in claiming that the lawyers instilled
a pervasive and resilient sense of public trust in the federal government.
Pointing to the Nye Commission's investigation of the wartime munitions
industry, Capozzola suggests that public confidence in the state became
much more tenuous by the 1930s. 9 The Treasury lawyers, however, did
not seek to legitimate all federal power. Indeed, in the process of policing
the jurisdictional boundaries of their department and agencies, they were
most concerned about the relationship between citizens and the U.S.
Treasury, not all other aspects of government. Given the growing size and
scope of federal power, citizens could differentiate between government
institutions, having faith in some (Treasury) and not others (Congress).
Still, Capozzola's larger point seems to be that if one follows the narrative
thread into the interwar years, one will likely find a much less sanguine pic-
ture of the Treasury lawyers' successes in building public trust. This may be
7. Woodrow Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics (Boston:
D.C. Heath, 1898), 572-73 (quoted in Capozzola, "Raising Revenue").
8. Leffingwell to Roper, Oct. 20, 1919, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder. Likewise,
Arthur Ballantine directed opponents of the excess-profits tax to focus their energies on
repealing the levy through democratically elected lawmakers rather than through the courts.
Ballantine, "Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax," Yale Law Journal 29
(6) (1919): 625-42, 635, 642.
9. Incidentally, congressional probes like the Nye Commission, and the Pecora
Investigation that preceded it, also highlighted the alleged machinations of bankers and
industrialists, and hence gave New Dealers ample, if exaggerated, justifications for bolstering
the powers of the regulatory, administrative state. See, William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (1963), 59, 9; David R. Mayhew, Divided
We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002 (2005), 156-57.
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true. 0 The onset of the Great Depression and the Hoover administration's
feeble response shattered public confidence in government and in the
business community.
Yet, even then, Treasury officials continued to argue that when it came
to the public fury over war profiteering, the state could not sit idly by.
During the early 1930s when Congress was reviewing general wartime pol-
icies, just as many parts of the world were lurching toward a second global
conflict, former World War I Treasury lawyer Arthur A. Ballantine reiter-
ated the importance of imposing confiscatory profits taxes to maintain
wartime public trust. As Undersecretary of Treasury in the Hoover admin-
istration, Ballantine contended that "any plan of war revenue legislation
should include a war profits tax designed to bring into Treasury, so far
as practical, the entire amount of profits due to war."" Ordinary
Americans may have found little solace in Ballantine's words, as the
Great Depression deepened and the Hoover administration remained inef-
fective, but the former World War I Treasury lawyer's remarks revealed the
residual hell-raising anger that resonated among some policymakers.
Historical Irony and Weberian Ambivalence
The periodization of "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" is also an
important concern for Michael Bernstein. Whereas Capozzola questions
where the story ends, Bernstein wonders where it should properly begin.
He agrees that lawyers, like nearly all modem (middle-class) professionals,
played a central role in building "the foundations of the twentieth-century
American state" and the "Pax Americana" of the "American Century." But
he acutely reminds us of the preexisting "unique array of material, econ-
omic, technological, and resource-based circumstances" that "privileged
the United States in altogether novel ways," and that "would have made
any professional elite look good." Bernstein is surely correct that a broader
comparative analysis of lawyers and state-building would reveal the under-
lying "crucial components of the growth of American power."' 12 In a larger
10. And it is one reason why "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" only claims that "the
lawyers helped build the trust between citizens and government that was essential to the
success of a liberal democracy engaged in global war" (emphasis added).
11. Arthur A. Ballantine, "War Policies in Taxation, Statement Before the War Policies
Commission," May 20, 1931, Record Group 56-General Records of the Office of the
Secretary of the Treasury, Box 187, Folder "Tax-Excess Profits & War Profits,
1923-32" National Archives and Record Administration II, College Park, Md.
12. "Lawyer, Guns, and Public Moneys" includes only a brief glimpse at the comparative
financing of World War I. But Christopher Capozzola's comment provides a useful brief
bibliography of important sources. See, Capozzola, "Raising Hell," 228n2.
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book project, of which "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Monies" is a part,
I explore some of the fundamental prerequisites of U.S. economic and pol-
itical development, including how the rise of managerial corporate capital-
ism led to seminal changes in economic organizations and institutions, and
how these changes provided lawmakers with new opportunities, or "tax
handles," to elaborate the development of an effective fiscal state.' 3
Nonetheless, a dominant focus on the material aspects of American devel-
opment, on the conventional measures of economic growth that have been at
the center of decades of U.S. macroeconomic history, may not adequately
uncover the "complicated process of historical change" that Bernstein else-
where in his comments has asked us to consider. Purely material accounts can
seem overly deterministic. Without greater attention to the political, intellec-
tual, and social factors that accompany material changes, one can lose sight
of the uncertainty, irony, and contingency of past events. As W. Elliot
Brownlee has suggested, "no complex of economic factors, narrowly
defined, can explain the centralization of government, the shifts in govern-
ment functions, and changes in the structure of public finance. Explanation
of the transitions must rest more heavily on an understanding of fundamental
shifts in civic values, bound up in the workings of politics and political
institutions, within the context of externally driven social crises."' 14
To be sure, Bernstein is neither an advocate, nor a practitioner, of a singular,
economic explanation of historical change, as his recent outstanding work on
the economics profession and the twentieth-century American state shows. 15
To the contrary, Bernstein has urged me to have a "more resolute appreciation
of the ironies" of my historical narrative, to focus on the political and ideologi-
cal aspects of the deployment of expertise, and to consider how the formal
rationality of professionalism can do as much to expand the means of expert
knowledge as it can to curtail the acceptable social dialogue about the ends of
public policy. 16 This is a highly cogent critique, and one that suggests I should
13. Portions of this theme are explored in Ajay K. Mehrotra, "American Economic
Development, Managerial Corporate Capitalism, and the Institutional Foundations of the
Modem Income Tax," Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming in 2010).
14. W. Elliot Brownlee, "The Public Sector," in The Cambridge Economic History of the
United States, Volume III: The Twentieth Century, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E.
Gallman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1017.
15. Michael Bernstein, A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in
Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), see,
especially, chap. 1.
16. Elsewhere, I have examined how late nineteenth-century political economists
interested in tax reform, and in furthering the "professionalism" of economics, belittled
the "amateur" advocacy of more radical reformers and quashed a fledgling affinity between
social gospel ministers and Henry George's single-tax (Ajay K. Mehrotra, "Envisioning
the Modem American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual
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clarify the many ways in which "Lawyers, Guns, and Moneys" does, indeed,
attend to the complex, contradictory, and contingent aspects of legal profes-
sionalism and state-building. From the use of their political power to assist
friends and colleagues, to their recruitment of young lawyers with the prom-
ises of postwar riches, to their formation of policies that would help the cor-
porate clients they served before, and would serve again after, the war, the
Treasury lawyers did not lose sight of their pecuniary interests. And, therefore,
they did not always act as apolitical or nonideological Tocquevillian
moderators.
The Treasury lawyers' political and ideological "bias" was perhaps most
evident in Leffingwell's privileging of the war-profits tax over the
excess-profits tax. Although he attempted to mediate the contending claims
of populists and conservatives, the former Cravath partner, unsurprisingly,
retained a self-serving faith in corporate capitalism as the motor of U.S.
economic prosperity. He never forgot from which side of these debates
he had emerged and would one day return. Thus, in the process of using
his legal expertise to support a war-profits tax-a levy that raised signifi-
cant revenue but by definition could be dismantled after the conflict-
Leffingwell reoriented the demands of activist social groups like the
Farmers' National Committee and populist lawmakers like Claude
Kitchin, who envisioned a radically different postwar fiscal order. The
Treasury lawyers, moreover, forged inconsistent policies that inadvertently
unleashed broader forces, and ultimately undermined the seemingly egali-
tarian goals of exacting shared wartime sacrifices. From all this, it is inac-
curate, I think, to see "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" as an
outmoded, "Whiggish" narrative of linear progress, or as a story celebrat-
ing unambiguously how a group of elite professionals came to the rescue of
a nation-state in crisis. Rather, "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" is,
I believe, a classic Weberian tale about the ambivalent aspects of modem
Westem rationality, about how the application of professional reason and
expertise can advance the means toward material well-being, while simul-
taneously circumscribing the spectrum of acceptable social policy. 17
Still, Bernstein may be correct that I have amplified the accomplish-
ments of my historical figures. After working in the official and personal
Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax," UCLA Law Review 52 [August 2005]: 1793-1866;
Mehrotra, "'Render Unto Caesar ... ' Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the Historical
Underpinnings of the Modem American Tax System," Loyola University Chicago Law
Review 40 [Winter 2009]: 321-67).
17. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196-244; see
also Rogers Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Moral and Social
Thought of Max Weber (1984), 35-43.
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papers of these lawyers, perhaps I have been afflicted with an academic
version of the Stockholm syndrome. But if I have accentuated the positive
aspects of the mobilization of legal expertise in state-building, I have done
so for two primary reasons. First, because the existing historiography has
too frequently concentrated on the limits and pathologies of the modem
American state, especially in the realm of fiscal policy, one of the aims
of my essay and the larger project is to provide a counterbalance to the con-
ventional narrative of declension-a narrative that tends to depict turn of
the century tax reform and state-building as at best a missed opportunity,
and at worst a sophisticated form of conservatism and further evidence
of the liberal state's hollow rhetoric of social justice.1 8
Second, one of the central objectives of my essay was not to valorize the
Treasury lawyers but to cast them as representative of a new breed of legal
professionals who made a distinctive contribution to the American state-
building project. They were among the first classes of Langdellian-
educated lawyers; the vanguard of progressive legal science; the pioneers
of the large, multispecialist law office. Perhaps most importantly, they
were the forerunners of the Washington Lawyers. As members of this
new class of elite legal professionals, the Treasury lawyers were imbued
with a sense of civic responsibility and public service that led them to tra-
verse back and forth between the private and public sectors. Although they
never lost sight of their own economic interests and those they served,
these new legal bureaucrats did, in fact, build a robust fiscal state amid a
political culture that remained skeptical of concentrated and centralized
public power. Populist leaders may have seen them as taming more radical
calls for change, but they saw themselves as realizing the social justice
ideals of the moderate administrative state.
If "Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys" is able to persuade readers to
consider the achievements and the limits of early twentieth-century fiscal
state-building, part of the reason will surely be the careful reading and
comments provided by Capozzola and Bemstein. These two scholars
have not only kindly encouraged me to think more carefully about
anger, irony, and the formal rationality of professionalism but in the
process they have also adroitly noted just why such a historical account
of U.S. state-building, professionalism, and fiscal citizenship may have
particular resonance for our own times.
18. See, for example, Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins
of the Federal Income Tax, 1861-1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Morton
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 19-27.
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The expansion of Law and History Review provides the necessary pages
to review sixty-five to seventy books per year. In addition, we are now
able to review more non-English language books and occasionally offer
multiple reviews of a monograph or important edited collection. Finally,
we plan to commission longer field review essays.
Alfred L. Brophy
University of North Carolina
Amalia D. Kessler
Stanford University
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